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COMMENT
Mediated populism, culture and media form
Michael Higgins1
ABSTRACT This comment seeks to identify some key concerns in the study of mediated
populism. The paper highlights the relationship between populism and political conditions,
noting that the weak party structures and non-conventional party-media relations that
characterise populist actors applies across the political left and right, who engage strategi-
cally according to media conditions. In setting out the terms in which mediated populism
operates, the paper stresses the turn to emotionality in media, with a particular prominence
on the expression of aggressiveness. It links with the rise of participatory media, with an
attendant shift in the style and form of language to characterise political discussion and
inﬂuences on legitimate political speech. The paper then looks at the use of “fake news” as a
means of positioning media within the discredited elite, warranting the easy dismissal of
hostile content. While showing how the political and media environment provides fertile
grounds for populism, and the extent to which populism is encouraged by media affordances,
the article concludes by recommending the purposeful cultivation by media of alternative and
proactive forms of inclusion and emotional engagement.
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Introduction
K
eeping track of the relationship between politics and media
is a key part of democratic thought; crucial not just to
overseeing the workings of government, but also in com-
prehending the limits and possibilities of political discourse in the
public sphere. Recently, much research has explored the extent to
which the imperatives of the communications industry exercise a
“mediatising” inﬂuence on political actors and institutions, where
“media logics” become a negotiated component of the grammar
of everyday political activity (Esser and Strömbäck, 2014; Higgins,
2018). Beyond even the democratic institutions of the West, this
compulsion towards media spectacle extends to the purposively-
mediated atrocities of terror groups such as ISIS (Harmanşah,
2015).
In this context, an increasing body of research is focussing on
the rise of populism. Initially associated with the class movements
of the early to mid-twentieth century (Kazin, 1998; Laclau, 1977),
populism has latterly become associated with the political acti-
vites of the right. Its use often compromised by what Brants
(2004, p 126) describes as “conceptual vagueness”, populism is
most recognisable in its root commitment to a virtuous “people”
in preference to those within the political, economic and
bureaucratic cadres of the elite (Canovan, 1981). Usually although
not exclusively associated with charismatic political actors such as
Berlusconi in Italy and Trump in the USA, the contemporary
iteration of populism has spread across Europe (Niemi, 2013), the
United States (Guardino and Snyder, 2012) and Southeast Asian
(Chakravartty and Roy, 2015). Even prior to the social media
platforms we discuss later, Mudde (2014) talked of the emergence
of a “populist zeitgeist” across political cultures.
As a way of discussing how politics and media operate together
within this developing political environment, what we call
“mediated populism” has, therefore, excited attention across
academics, policy-makers and political commentators. This work
has looked not just at the communicative strategies of politicians
committed to a populist ethos, but also at how populism is
mediated more broadly. Chakravartty and Roy (2015, p 313)
describe mediated populism as the imperatives of populism
coming to prominence in a “new logics of political communica-
tion”. Over the course of this short paper, I want to foreground a
number of factors that should inform our understanding of
mediated populism, and take the opportunity to highlight some of
the ways this relates to existent interests in the study of media and
communications.
Populism and political conditions
The majority of recent studies of populism in media have con-
centrated on its foothold amongst the political right, and its
alignment with discourses around anti-immigration and neoli-
beralism (Wodak et al., 2013; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2017).
This clustering of populist activity has occasioned such expanded
descriptions as “right-wing populism” (Burack and Snyder-Hall,
2012) as well as references to a “neo-populism” associated with
the various libertarian monetarists (Mazzoleni et al., 2008).
Burack and Snyder-Hall (2012, p 440) trace this current swell in
populism on the right to a backlash against government inter-
vention into “private and semi-public corporations” after the
ﬁnancial crash of 2007, feedings an anti-state agenda exploited
and aided by right-wing media radio hosts dedicated to fostering
disillusionment with institutional politics (Mort, 2012). In
structural terms too, Aalberg and De Vreese (2017) suggest that
weaker party organisation among the extreme right has produced
a greater dependence on media to compensate for a lack of local
party workers. Combined with what Mudde (2014) portrays as
the right’s willingness to embrace popular media preferences for
“drama” over leaden policy statements, there are fertile grounds
for the gratuitous use of populist rhetoric in the right-wing’s
pursuit of common cause with the electorate.
However, Laclau’s (2005, p 129) account of populisms of the
past shows the possibility of alternative orientations towards
populism in the “strategic aims” of parties on the political left,
including his own account of the Italian Communist Party. When
looking at the incidences of populism across the political spec-
trum, we can see that obstacles to political effective political
campaigning are of as much importance as political ideology. In
common with the examples of the right referred to above, Jeremy
Corbyn’s UK Labour Party entered the campaign for the 2017
general election challenged by internal institutional strife and
beset by hostility from the majority of media outlets. For all this,
the projection of Corbyn’s anti-establishment persona at public
events, combined with populist-related themes of popular
empowerment, produced substantial electoral gains. However,
whereas the right ring populism described above is able to rely
upon a sector of media for explicit support (Mort, 2012), Corbyn
allied themes of popular unity with a virtuous dependence on
coverage of what Boorstin (1961, p 9) describes as the “pseudo-
events” of rallies and speeches.
Of course, in addition to the status of the political actors,
populism is contingent upon shifts in the prevailing political
hegemony. Pasquino (2008, p 37) identiﬁes the perception of “an
overall condition of unease within western electorates”. Rather
than the production of some spontaneous and choreographed
disillusionment among the people, we are witness to the retreat of
the state from public service allied to its redirection towards
implementing economic austerity (Burack and Snyder-Hall,
2012), and the brute emphasis on bureaucracy endemic in “the
technology of the mass party” (Pasquino, 2008, p 38). As well as
showing an understanding its historical ﬂexibility, an informed
study of populism must therefore attend to developments in the
political and cultural environment within which it draws suste-
nance, including a substantial focus on the media’s representation
of the state of politics (Wodak, 2009). As we have seen exploited
by populists from both right and left, this disillusionment extends
from political culture to the circumvention of conventional news
media.
The persistence of populism
It is, therefore, useful to think of populism not as a political
doctrine, but as an underlying relational attitude that is manifest
in primarily oppositional forms of political rhetoric that can be
directed against or in tactical collaboration with media. In
Laclau’s (2005) terms, populism is “hollow” of political principles
and ideologies as such, and instead provides a motivating basis
for political action, or at least the expression of a suitable political
rhetoric. However, in parallel with political conditions of dis-
illusionment, the contrast provided by Pasquino’s (2008)
bureaucratisation of the political establishment, set against
longer-term shifts in media culture and technology towards the
democratisation of production, seems likely to continue to pro-
duce fertile conditions for populist discourse; not least in
admitting what Habermas (1989) refers to as the experiential
language of the “lifeworld” to public discourse on politics.
In thinking about the pervasiveness of populism and its links to
political crisis and to technological and cultural change, Mazzo-
leni (2008, p 57–58) refers to “the populist contamination of
political discourse”, the chief symptom of which is a new “master
frame” of political discourse. In coming to dominance, populism
offers a political conceit of popular representativeness and
authenticity to which other political actors and institutions
become answerable. Far from giving us leave to dismiss populism
as another rhetorical fad, this should alert us to the adaptability
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and sustainability of populism tropes across media platforms and
through political cycles.
Populism and emotionality in media
The introduction promised to identify themes in mediated
populism, and we look ﬁrst to the rise of emotionality in media.
Scannell (1996) argues that the compulsion of unscripted per-
formance in broadcast media in particular has always been
towards projecting an outwardly empathetic relationship with the
individual audience member in a “sociable” arrangement. In
media’s pursuit of news values too, empathy and emotional
competence have become increasingly prominent (Richards,
2007; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2017, forthcoming). Lunt and Stenner
(2005), for example, point to the development of a virtual
“emotional public sphere”, the illusion of which has been exem-
pliﬁed in confession and disclosure-based public participation
programming. In a manner that echoes Montgomery’s (1999)
analysis of the mediated, performed sincerity of politicians in
public, an emotional public sphere intervenes in and reconﬁgures
hierarchies of legitimacy, such that responses and contributions
are weighed according to their success in producing a display of
emotional commitment.
As to the tenor of this emotion, recent work on “belligerent
broadcasting” (Erikson, 2014; Higgins and Smith, 2017) has
highlighted the particular rise of anger and indignation as legit-
imate performative expressions in media. Similar expressions of
this anger provide the emotional drivers of much contemporary
populist discourse in media and elsewhere (Wahl-Jorgensen,
2017, forthcoming). In this context, populism panders to media
expectations by ventriloquising the frustration of the people with
those disinterested or corrupt elites that are presented as exer-
cising arbitrary power over their lives: the righteous “indignation”
of the public (Higgins, 2013). While this use of indignation is
often apparent in even the most benign and opportunistic uses of
populist rhetoric, such as its limited use of populism by UK
Conservatives (Higgins, 2013), it is more to the fore among overt
populists such as Sarah Palin (Higgins, 2009) and the current US
President Donald Trump (Higgins and Smith, 2017, p 93; Wahl-
Jorgensen, 2017, forthcoming).
Towards the media logics of populism
As Mazzoleni (2008) points out, the analysis of mediated popu-
lism is answerable to the histories, norms, limits and possibilities
of media technology. Having argued that populism moves in
accord with the emotional turn in media culture, it is also useful
to consider media’s internal generic development, as well as its
technological affordances. We have already referred to the com-
pulsion of unscripted broadcasting to account for the norms of
sociability (Scannell, 1996), but the technical and conventional
demands of media extend far beyond these partial and context-
speciﬁc efforts at para-social interaction. For one thing, in generic
terms there are various and often conﬂicting priorities across
entertainment and news-driven genres, with varying levels of
compatibility with populist discourses (Mazzoleni et al., 2003). In
terms of how these engage with political content more broadly,
Street et al. (2017) identify a coming to dominance of genres
conventionally associated with entertainment, markedly in the
sketch-based satire of the left (Jones, 2010) and the populist talk
radio of the right (Higgins, 2008: 65; Mort, 2012).
However, the truly paradigmatic shift in media, technology and
culture over the past few decades have been towards participation
and interactivity. There is, ﬁrst of all, what Livingstone and Lunt
(1992) identiﬁed as the beginnings of a move in broadcasting
towards giving a voice to members of the public; routinely, as
Fenton et al. (1998) have noted, in a manner designed to
emphasis “ordinary” over “expert” voices. There is also the
increasing realisation of Berners-Lee’s original vision of a fully-
interactive internet in the development of Web 2.0., producing an
online environment dominated by user-engagement and expres-
sion. Along with the emotionalisation of the public sphere, this
sees the language of everyday argument come to prominence in
online discussion of politics and current affairs, occasionally
manifest in the personalised abuse of political trolling (Higgins
and Smith, 2014).
Much of the work into the relationship between politicians and
celebrity has stressed this shift towards engagement in social
media and the performed “authenticity” of language and style
that is markedly non-political (Wheeler, 2013). In understanding
the consistency and intensity of these personas and how they join
in the emotive language of social media, it is important to remain
alert to Stanyer et al. (2017) distinction between overtly populist
politicians such as Donald Trump, and those politicians,
including Jeremy Corbyn, that draw upon populist discourses
more selectively on the basis of their circumstances, deploying
their underdog status as part of an outsider-themed commu-
nicative strategy.
The populism of Twitter
As we have argued, in a manner that gathered pace in the 2008
Obama campaign (Levenshus, 2010), political communications
has become dependent on social media for gathering and orga-
nising support, as well as for conveying consistent political slo-
gans and themes. However, the 2016 campaign of Donald Trump
for the US presidency made more use of the microblogging
platform Twitter to exploit an incendiary and “straight-talking”
public persona (Higgins and Smith, 2017). In the management of
this political presence after victory, his personal and long-
standing @RealDonaldTrump account has maintained some
separation from the ofﬁcial @POTUS account. In a manner that
distinguishes his authentic and spontaneous self from his ofﬁcial
capacity, @RealDonaldTrump is used to combine personal and
political sentiments, while announcing policy intentions in a
manner previously associated with the elite environment of the
White House press brieﬁng. While neither account is committed
to decorum in conventional political terms, @RealDonaldTrump
remains an expressive embodiment of Trump’s pre-election anti-
political mode.
Oborne and Roberts (2017: xxvii) write of the populist qualities
of Trump’s choice of media platform:
Twitter is an ideal medium for appealing to any supposed
“silent majority”. It is completely democratic. Anyone can
join, at no cost. There are no restrictions and no ﬁltering
(except in rare extreme cases). Twitter allows a candidate to
appeal at a personal level to anyone who is against anything
and make him or her feel like part of a vast shared
community without having to meet or even acknowledge
any of its other members.
As well as the aura of popular participation and frank
expression that surrounds the platform of Twitter, there is the
brevity of expression associated with the platform, where Trump
rarely exceeds the 140 character limit of a fully visible Tweet. This
has two implications for our understanding Trump’s relationship
with mediated populism. We have already noted that his choice of
language and theme is designed to produce a form of popular
appeal, based on the expression of an anti-politics from a char-
acter positioned outside of the political mainstream. One of his
favoured themes of this account is to malign “expert” voices, in-
so-doing extending the cursed “establishment” to include dis-
senting climate scientists and economists, all to the detriment of
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the quality of public discourse. As well as this, in his appro-
priation of Twitter, one of the prominent parts of Trump’s
expressive strategy is inherently short-form, leaving limited room
for reasoning and nuance beyond the initial declaration or
emotional outburst. In a relevant study of soundbites in a tele-
vision context, Scheuer (2001) argues they produce simpliﬁed
arguments, dependent upon existing popular prejudices. Rather
than the more complex explanations required by proponents of
regulation and collective responsibility, Twitter form will tend to
suit the libertarian right-wing and proponents of small
government.
Of course, Twitter allows any number of responses, to which
the original poster can reply. However, Trump’s default refusal to
engage in these dialogic capabilities of Twitter (Oborne and
Roberts, 2017) accords with the ﬁndings of Larsson and Moe
(2011, p 741) that the political discourse of the platform favours
one-way dissemination over debate. Conveniently, this use of
Twitter as the carrier of short, non-cohesive declarations sub-
sumes even the internal contradictions of Trump’s populism—
such as his statism, against the populist right’s commitment to
small government—within a montage of purposeful incoherence.
Dismissing mainstream media—‘‘fake news’’
Above, we discussed Jeremy Corbyn’s use of what might be
described as “pseudo-events” (Boorstin, 1961) to negotiate past a
hostile media agenda. This claimed antagonistic relationship with
the media establishment is an important component to much
mediated populism. And as the online communicative tactics of
ISIS show (Harmanşah, 2015), ease of access to Twitter is in
keeping with the enactment of even a grotesque mutation of
outsider politics. Returning to the example of Trump, the range of
his populist vitriol extends to this “mainstream media”, which his
rhetoric holds accountable for the production of “fake news”.
Properly deﬁned, fake news refers to invented news stories that
are passed off as genuine (Wardle, 2017), the spread of which are
owed to a combination of the democratisation of information
media production and the deprofessionalisation of formal news
gathering. As such, argues Wardle (2017), fake news is as much a
product of a participatory “information ecosystem” as a conscious
disaffection with conventional authority. Addressing how the
term is used in informed discussion, Corner (2017) warns against
conﬂating the production of “fraudulent media product” we see
in fake news as deﬁned by Wardle (2017) with the distribution of
the range of politically contestable but entirely legitimate material
that deﬁnes an agonistic political public sphere.
Nonetheless, purposively ill-deﬁned accusations of fake news—
a term Trump frequently incorporates into a Twitter hashtag—
are essential to Trump’s populist persona as an anti-politician
that is under siege from the old order; giving him warrant to
brandish this label to demean inconvenient content of good
standing. Yet, for all its misuse as a description, it is useful to keep
in mind that the production of fake news is a useful tactic of dark
political campaigning, and that recent studies have shown that its
distribution is as much a tactic of the political left as it is the right
(BBC, 2017). Even so, in presenting opportunities for bias con-
formation and the easy dismissal of elite discourse, the accusatory
powers of fake news accord with the populist drive to include
recalcitrant media in any vision of the corrupt rulers.
Conclusion
As Mazzoleni (2008) argues above, as long as it remains a suc-
cessful political strategy and appeals to dominant narratives of
government and political power, much of mediated politics is
likely to remain answerable to populism. To some extent,
populism’s prominence is contingent upon some measure of
approval for those charismatic leaders that often animate its
sentiments or to the continued incorruptibility of those move-
ments that lay claim to the virtues of popular alignment, although
we have noted that these vary in their political character. We also
have to consider the staying power of populism as the basis for a
style of persuasive political engagement. As a corrective to the
claims outlined above for populism’s adaptability, just as political
rhetoric is conventionally obliged to avoid appearing political
(Martin, 2014, p 3), so this limitation may equally apply to
populist claims to authenticity and popular alignment. Aside even
from what Enli (2014) identiﬁes as the always-shifting terms of
mediated authenticity, as we reach a point at which a populist
affection becomes a convention of political exchange, it may well
become what Rogers (1981, p 42) dismisses as “debased currency”.
In the meantime, we meet those qualities that have come to
dominance in this iteration of populism: a politics that is angry
rather than conciliatory in tone, and oppositional rather than
constructive as to the potential of government. In seeking an
alternative for populism, the media-politics nexus might com-
prehend and exploit the advantages of both populism and news’s
commitment to emotive vitality, and seek to draw upon news
values in different and creative ways: productively exploiting the
journalistic appetite for human interest and positivity. In short, a
media discourse engaged in an alternative to populism might
reconsider formal commitments to objectivity and balance, and
presume to select and accentuate the key principles of democratic
belonging.
Alternatively, there are already strains of this in the conven-
tional practice of journalists placing their neutrality aside and
pursuing an agenda on behalf of their perceived “public” (Mon-
tgomery, 2007; Higgins, 2008). In this regard, media might con-
tribute to a shared political culture through a exercising a greater
and publicly-sanctioned ferocity in its defence of the values of
competent and truthful government, elected by and held
accountable to an informed democratic polity. Going forward,
any such news cultures should be as expressively robust as
populism and as exploitative of new media: unabashed in their
commitment to environmental care, to freedom with responsi-
bility, and to the abiding principles of human decency.
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